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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DATA DEFICITS IN MUNICIPAL RIDESHARE COLLABORATIONS

DEEPA DAS ACEVEDO*
INTRODUCTION
Less than ten years have passed since rideshare companies began offering
peer-to-peer services. 1 In that time, the concerns triggered by rideshare labor
have shifted dramatically, going from consumer protection to the conditions of
work in this new industry. 2 This Article sketches the contours of what will, or
should, be the next area of focus for observers of rideshare labor: public services

* Assistant Professor, Culverhouse School of Law at the University of Alabama. I am grateful to
Miriam Cherry and Matt Bodie for the opportunity to participate in this symposium; to Marcia
McCormick, Nicole Porter, Veronica Root, and Ani Santz for comments on the paper; to Yonathan
Arbel for helping me construct the “Model Contract Language” in Part III(B); to Dean Ted Ruger
at Penn Law for supporting this research; and, as always, to John Felipe Acevedo.
1. Sidecar, which was founded in 2011 and closed in 2015, was the first peer-to-peer, ondemand rideshare service. Uber and Lyft both began offering peer-to-peer services in 2012. Carolyn
Said, Ride-Sharing Pioneer Sidecar to Shut Down Ride, Delivery Service, SFGATE (Dec. 29, 2015,
3:02 PM), https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Ride-sharing-pioneer-Sidecar-to-shut-downride-6726144.php [https://perma.cc/4NRP-23HT].
2. On consumer protection concerns see, e.g., Olivia Nuzzi, Uber’s Biggest Problem Isn’t
Surge Pricing. What If It’s Sexual Harassment by Drivers?, THE DAILY BEAST (Mar. 28, 2014,
1:19 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/ubers-biggest-problem-isnt-surge-pricing-what-if-itssexual-harassment-by-drivers [https://perma.cc/2L8N-3PTJ]; Ellen Huet, Uber Rider Might Lose
an Eye from Driver’s Hammer Attack. Could Uber Be Held Liable?, FORBES (Sept. 30, 2014, 9:37
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/09/30/uber-driver-hammer-attack-liability/#59
7c9fa759ca [https://perma.cc/TTS4-TRBJ]. On working conditions, consider the fact that entire
conferences addressing labor and employment issues in the sharing economy were held at the
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania (Nov. 2015), The University of Chicago Law
School (Nov. 2016); Rutgers School of Management and Labor Relations (Nov. 2016); the Marco
Biagi Foundation (Mar. 2017); the University of Amsterdam (Oct. 2017); and St. Louis University
School of Law (Mar. 2018), among others. The Economic Policy Institute (the “EPI”) and the
National Employment Law Project both began analyzing work issues arising out of the sharing
economy in 2015. Benjamin Kreider, Risk Shift and the Gig Economy, ECON. POL’Y INST.:
WORKING ECON. BLOG (Aug. 4, 2015, 2:00 PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/risk-shift-and-the-gigeconomy/ [https://perma.cc/6N7L-8B5G] (reflecting EPI’s earliest commentary on gig work, based
on a search of its website); Rebecca Smith, Rights on Demand: Ensuring Workplace Standards and
Worker Security in the On-Demand Economy, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (Sept. 9, 2015),
https://www.nelp.org/publication/rights-on-demand/ [https://perma.cc/T255-GG68] (reflecting the
National Employment Law Project’s earliest commentary on gig work, based on a search of its
website).
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contracts for transportation provision. In particular, I argue that municipalities 3
contracting with Uber and Lyft need to appreciate the importance of the data that
is generated by rideshare transportation and need to do a better job of negotiating
and constructing contracts that incorporate data-sharing protocols. Otherwise,
municipal actors will create data deficits today that promise regulatory and
infrastructural problems tomorrow.
Rideshare data—the mass of information regarding transit patterns and user
demographics that drivers and passengers automatically produce whenever they
participate in an Uber or Lyft ride—is one of the things that makes app-based
transportation possible, appealing, and powerful. When aggregated, it provides
an astounding sky view of how a city moves during a specific period of time.
Despite this, existing public-private contracts mostly do not reflect the
importance of rideshare data.
This Article speaks to two admittedly distinct audiences. On the one hand,
it paints the landscape of public-private collaborations for legal scholars who
may be interested in the contracts, labor and employment, and local government
law challenges (among others) that these collaborations present. While this
descriptive work may also be useful for policy analysts and government actors,
it is largely directed toward scholars—many of whom may be familiar with the
consumer protection or work law concerns triggered by gig labor but unaware
of the growing and rapidly changing area of activity I describe here.
On the other hand, the Article speaks to policy analysts and, especially, to
municipal actors by articulating why data deficits matter, why they occur, and
what might be done to mitigate or avoid them. My goal here is explicitly in the
tradition of “engaged anthropology” 4—namely, to give back to the interlocutors
who have shared their experiences with me. In this Article I do so by describing
the potential costs associated with data deficits (so that local officials can share
these concerns with their superiors and their constituencies) and by offering
some model contract language (so that officials have a baseline to reference
when they open negotiations with rideshare companies).
This is a tall order for a short Article and consequently what follows is
naturally abbreviated and dense, although I have tried to be as little of either as
possible. Part I(A) describes four types of public-private collaborations
involving rideshare providers: first/last mile, safe ride, blanket subsidy, and
3. I use the term “municipality” in this Article because the entity contracting with Uber is not
always a city—sometimes, as with the Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority discussed in I(B), it is a
county actor.
4. Setha M. Low and Sally Engle Merry, Engaged Anthropology: Diversity and Dilemmas,
An Introduction to Supplement 2, 51 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY, S203, S204 (2010) (observing
that “sharing knowledge production and power with community members” is one of the “many
paths toward public engagement on social issues” that Anthropology as a discipline has pursued).
To this end, and insofar as it is possible to do so, the Article is being directly shared with all of the
interlocutors cited in it.
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para-transit or non-emergency medical transportation. Part I(B) offers an indepth exploration of one such collaboration, the “Direct Connect” program
developed by Uber and the Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority (the “PSTA”) in
Florida, which was likely the first public transit contract to involve a rideshare
platform. Part II explains why the data generated by rideshare companies in the
course of providing public transportation services is useful to municipalities. It
also identifies various reasons why municipalities are not getting the data they
need out of these collaborations. Part III first suggests some broad approaches
to fixing the problem of data deficits before taking up one particular
suggestion—better contracts—and offering some model contract language as
well as a discussion of that language.
Throughout, I draw on conversations with transit experts and municipal
actors, as well as on media coverage and policy analysis. 5 Some of my
conversations took place during fieldwork conducted in 2016–17 while I was
studying worker classification in the gig economy. 6 Others occurred more
recently, after I was able to return to the problem of public-private collaborations
with rideshare companies. There is relatively little information to be had right
now but these conversations reflect the experiences of some of the first-movers
in this field, and I present them here in the hopes that they will be useful to
scholars and public actors going forward.
I. THE SCOPE OF PUBLIC/PRIVATE CONTRACTS WITH RIDESHARE PLATFORMS
Around 2015, rideshare platforms began entering into public service
contracts with municipalities around the United States. 7 Municipalities that
contract with rideshare companies do so because they are captivated by the
chance to improve existing services, to offer some wholly new services and,
especially, to offer existing services at lower costs. 8 This section outlines four
5. My thanks to the many individuals who generously shared their time and expertise with
me, including but not limited to: Jeremy Mohler, Ben Davis (In the Public Interest); Kirk
Hovenkotter, Zak Accuardi, Mel Plaut (TransitCenter); Todd Brogan, Michael McCall-Delgado
(Amalgamated Transit Union); Bonnie Epstein (Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority); Paul Mackie
(Mobility Lab); Diogo Lousa, James Paci (Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority); Harry
Campbell (TheRideshareGuy).
6. The primary project to come out of that fieldwork is Deepa Das Acevedo, Unbundling
Freedom in the Sharing Economy, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 793 (2018).
7. I use 2015 as a start date for these partnerships because it is when the PSTA began
conceptualizing its Direct Connect pilot program in collaboration with Uber. Direct Connect is
generally acknowledged to be the earliest public transit contract with a rideshare platform; the first
phase of the pilot program went into effect in February 2016. E-mail from Bonnie Epstein, Transit
Planner, Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority, to Deepa Das Acevedo, Sharswood Fellow, U. Pa. L.
Sch. (Jan. 25, 2018, 16:39 EST) (on file with author); Telephone Interview with Bonnie Epstein,
Transit Planner, Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority (Jan. 19, 2018).
8. My thanks to Zak Accuardi for pointing out the full range of motivations behind public
actors’ engagement with rideshare companies. Accuardi notes that on-demand carpooling to fixed-
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types of transportation programs that were described to me by municipal actors
and transit experts before turning to a case study of one particular program. 9 All
of these types of programs are not equally common or successful, but they each
model a way of engaging with rideshare companies that is either currently being
pursued by municipalities or may once again be pursued by them.
A.

Relevant Programs and Providers

To date, most public contracts with rideshare companies have aimed to
extend the reach of available mass transit networks through the provision of
“first/last mile” transportation. In a first/last mile program, a municipal actor
subsidizes the cost of getting to and from fixed-route transit hubs (like bus or
light rail stations) and residential areas that are not quite within walking distance
of a hub. 10 Most first/last mile programs have relied on taxicabs to provide this
service: for every taxi ride that begins or ends at a transportation hub and occurs
within a designated zone, users receive a subsidy on the fare. The subsidy is
often but not always in the form of a percentage discount up to predetermined
ceiling—for example, fifty percent off up to a maximum of three dollars.
Second, at least one municipal agency has created a “safe ride” program
with Uber. 11 Safe ride programs offer subsidized on-demand transportation to
and from approved locations for eligible users during hours when mass transit is
unavailable. They may function in ways that are similar to first/last mile
programs—that is, using a percentage subsidy up to a flat cap—but unlike
first/last mile programs, safe ride services may not emphasize travel to or from
fixed-route hubs.
A third type of rideshare collaboration involves contracts for paratransit
services and non-emergency medical transportation services. 12 The

route transit hubs are a wholly new service facilitated by rideshare technology, while on-demand
paratransit is an improvement on an existing service. E-mail from Zak Accuardi, Senior Program
Analyst, TransitCenter to Deepa Das Acevedo, Sharswood Fellow, U. Pa. L. Sch. (Feb. 2, 2018,
11:33 EST) (on file with author).
9. I do not include a fifth and closely related type of program, “microtransit,” in my analysis
because these collaborations may or may not rely on rideshare platforms as vendors. However,
microtransit likely presents many of the same data-sharing concerns I discuss here.
10. Telephone Interview with Jeremy Mohler and Benjamin Davis, Communications
Specialist and Research & Policy Analyst, In the Public Interest (Aug. 12, 2016).
11. The PSTA’s “Transportation Disadvantaged Late Shift” program is an example of a safe
ride service. See Transportation Disadvantaged Program, PINELLAS SUNCOAST TRANSIT AUTH.,
https://psta.net/programs/td-transportation-disadvantaged/ [https://perma.cc/P964-9VYW] (last
visited Aug. 25, 2018).
12. Fact Sheet, Let Medicaid Give You a Ride, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.
(Apr. 2016), https://www.cms.gov/medicare-medicaid-coordination/fraud-prevention/medicaid-in
tegrity-education/downloads/nemt-factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJX2-4CY7] (describing as
follows: “Medicaid covers rides for eligible individuals to and from the doctor’s office, the hospital,
or another medical office for Medicaid-approved care.”).
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Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (the “MBTA”) is currently
conducting a paratransit pilot using Uber and Lyft that is expected to continue
until July 1, 2019. 13 The MBTA’s program is likely the first paratransit pilot in
the country to use rideshare platforms as providers. Washington, D.C., has also
considered partnering with Uber for both paratransit and non-emergency
medical transportation, although so far it appears that neither program has
materialized. 14
Fourth, “blanket subsidies” also use platform companies to offer on-demand
public transit but they usually carry significantly fewer restrictions on points of
origin or destination than do first/last mile programs—they are essentially whole
public transit systems run through rideshare subsidies. For instance, the
Canadian town of Innisfil, Ontario, now subsidizes all Uber rides within its
boundaries because it has chosen to contract with Uber in lieu of running a
traditional bus service. 15 Likewise, Altamonte Springs, Florida, is part of a fivecity consortium that subsidizes all inter-city Uber rides. 16
Each type of program raises different concerns and the newness and relative
fluidity of the collaborations makes it difficult to speak with confidence across
genres. Data-sharing, however, is important for all these programs for the
reasons I discuss in Part II(A)—what varies is the type of data that matters. In
the following subsection I use the experience of the earliest first/last mile
collaboration as a case study to demonstrate both the conditions under which
rideshare partnerships develop and the costs of data deficits.
B.

The PSTA’s “Direct Connect” Program 17

The PSTA primarily oversees public transportation for the Pinellas County
portion of the Tampa Bay metropolitan statistical area (the “Tampa MSA”). The

13. On-Demand Paratransit Pilot Program, MASS. BAY TRANSP. AUTH., https://www.mbta.
com/accessibility/the-ride/on-demand-pilot [https://perma.cc/EC5J-HDVA] (last visited Jan. 3,
2019).
14. Martin Di Caro, Metro Rejects Ride-Hailing Apps in Move to Outsource Paratransit in
Maryland, WAMU.ORG (Sept. 6, 2017), https://wamu.org/story/17/09/06/metro-rejects-ride-hail
ing-apps-move-outsource-paratransit-maryland/ [https://perma.cc/5EHF-2AJW]; Mark Segraves
& Andrea Swalec, DC EMS Department Considering Uber for Transporting Some 911 Callers,
NBCWASHINGTON.COM (July 11, 2016, 3:47 PM), https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/
DC-EMS-Department-Considering-Uber-for-Transporting-Some-911-Callers-386342771.html
[https://perma.cc/34WW-5SYW].
15. Lauren Pelley, Innisfil, Ont., Partners with Uber to Create Substitute for Public Transit,
CBC.CA (May 15, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/innisfil-uber-partner
ship-launching-1.4114816 [https://perma.cc/7RJT-ZK7F].
16. Five Central Florida Cities Wrap Up Unique Uber Pilot, CITY OF ALTAMONTE SPRINGS,
http://www.altamonte.org/736/Uber [https://perma.cc/G3GY-5Q2V] (last visited Jan. 3, 2019).
17. Much of the information in this section came from both TransitCenter’s report and from
my exchanges with a member of the PSTA staff, Bonnie Epstein. Wherever a specific piece of
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Tampa MSA is one of the twenty largest in the United States by population but
for several reasons it is difficult to organize efficient public transit for the area. 18
To begin with, its population is high volume but low density: its three major
cities (Tampa, St. Petersburg, and Clearwater) are spread out over two counties
and together account for only one quarter of the region’s total population. 19 It
spends less, both absolutely and per capita, on public transit than many of its
peers like San Diego, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Denver-Aurora. 20 And transit
within the Tampa MSA is coordinated by county-based agencies like the PSTA
despite the fact that the region’s cities cut across county lines. 21
Beyond these structural challenges to maintaining adequate public transit,
the PSTA has also faced financial shortfalls due to depressed property tax
revenues. 22 In 2012, the agency began working on an expansion plan,
“Greenlight Pinellas,” that would address both cost and coverage issues. 23
However, in November 2014, Greenlight Pinellas was defeated in a
referendum. 24 The following year, PSTA’s board began brainstorming new
ways to maximize services provision in a revenue-neutral way and to find

information came from only one of these sources, or from a third source, I have indicated as much
in the footnotes.
18. American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 2018), https://factfinder.census.
gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk [https://perma.cc/7QYS-HV3W]
(ranking the Tampa MSA as the eighteenth largest in the United States by population).
19. 2017 census estimates for the combined population of Tampa city, St. Petersburg, and
Clearwater are 764,198, roughly twenty-five percent of the the overall population of the Tampa
MSA of 3,091,399. Quick Facts: St Petersburg city, FL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.cen
sus.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/stpetersburgcityflorida [https://perma.cc/5D44-DB6F] (last visited
Jan. 3, 2019); Quick Facts: Clearwater city, FL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/clearwatercityflorida/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/A2Q7-KXAK] (last
visited Jan. 3, 2019); Quick Facts: Tampa city, FL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.
gov/quickfacts/fact/table/tampacityflorida/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/72Q8-NYJR] (last visited
Jan. 3, 2019); Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL Metro Area, CENSUS REPORTER, https://cen
susreporter.org/profiles/31000US45300-tampa-st-petersburg-clearwater-fl-metro-area/ [https://per
ma.cc/YTC6-WSGB] (last visited Jan. 3, 2019).
20. TRANSITCENTER, FIRST OF THE FIRST-LAST MILES, (forthcoming) (on file with author)
(hereinafter FIRST OF THE FIRST-LAST MILES).
21. Id. The TransitCenter report states that there are three counties in the Tampa MSA. This
is likely a reference to Pinellas County, Hillsborough County, and Pasco County, which the Office
of Management and Budget describes as “central” counties, although the Office also includes
Hernando County within the Tampa MSA. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OMB BULLETIN No. 1002, Update of Statistical Area Definitions and Guidance on Their Uses 51 (Dec. 1, 2009),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/bulletins/b10-02.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5Y8J-GFKH].
22. PSTA, ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 2, 10, (Sept. 30, 2010) (on file with author).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 5.
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alternatives for fixed-route services. 25 It also signaled an interest in
incorporating rideshare companies into the agency’s programming that was
inspired by a subsidized “safe ride” program operated by the University of
Florida Student’s Association. 26 By late-2015, the PSTA had identified two bus
routes for discontinuation; these would become the basis for a new pilot program
that would eventually be branded “Direct Connect.” 27
Local political squabbles ensured that Uber would only be part of the
replacement strategy for one of the two bus routes, but otherwise the two pilot
zones operated similarly. 28 Trips had to start or end at one of two designated
Direct Connect locations and would be subsidized at a rate of fifty percent up to
$3 per ride. 29 In Pinellas Park, the zone where Uber operated as a Direct Connect
provider, the approved locations were a Walmart that had been the lone
commercial stop for the old bus route and the Pinellas Park Transit Center. 30
The growth and maturation of the Direct Connect program is a worthwhile
study in its own right and transit experts and agencies alike are beginning to seek
out lessons from the PSTA’s experience. 31 Representatives from Chattanooga,
TN; St. Louis, MO; Westchester County, NY; and Broward County, FL have
spoken to the PSTA about its experiences operating the first direct government
subsidy program involving Uber. 32 Moreover, the lessons from Direct Connect
cut across a number of areas, including the need to ensure accessibility in new
services, the importance of local “champions” for public experiments, and the

25. Id.; Telephone Interview with Bonnie Epstein, Transit Planner, Pinellas Suncoast Transit
Authority (Jan. 19, 2018).
26. Telephone Interview with Bonnie Epstein, Transit Planner, Pinellas Suncoast Transit
Authority (Jan. 19, 2018).
27. FIRST OF THE FIRST-LAST MILES, supra note 20, at 8.
28. The two routes were the Pinellas Park Circulator (Route 444) and the East Lake Circulator
(Route 811); Uber eventually became a provider for Route 444. The politician who objected to
Uber being a service provider in East Lake was then-State Senator Latvala. FIRST OF THE FIRSTLAST MILES, supra note 20, at 5–6, 8.
29. Telephone Interview with Bonnie Epstein, Transit Planner, Pinellas Suncoast Transit
Authority (Jan. 19, 2018).
30. A ride counts as starting or ending in a Direct Connect location if it is within 800 feet of
the designated stop. Originally, the eligibility circle was a much narrower 400 feet, but user
feedback prompted the agency to widen the area. E-mail from Bonnie Epstein, Transit Planner,
Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority, to Deepa Das Acevedo, Sharswood Fellow, U. Pa. L. Sch.
(Jan. 30, 2018, 17:31 EST) (on file with author).
31. Most prominent among these studies of the Direct Connect program is, of course, the
TransitCenter study cited in this Article.
32. E-mail from Bonnie Epstein, Transit Planner, Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority, to
Deepa Das Acevedo, Sharswood Fellow, U. Pa. L. Sch. (Jan. 26, 2018, 09:54 EST) (on file with
author).
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value of designing contracts with multiple providers in mind while nonetheless
vetting each potential provider before incorporating it into the program. 33
For the purposes of this Article, however, there is one aspect of the PSTA’s
experience that is especially important. From the very beginning of its
interaction with Uber, the PSTA has struggled to access basic information about
its own pilot program. In Phase 1 of the program, the agency received invoices
from Uber “sporadically”—rather than monthly, as agreed upon—with a total
dollar figure rather than cost per ride. 34 The invoices were irregular enough that
the agency felt the program was partly free. 35 Moreover, since the invoices the
PSTA did receive were not itemized, there was no information regarding the
rides themselves—for instance, their origin, destination, or duration. 36 In Phase
2, the PSTA received slightly more regular (although still not monthly) invoices
with the number of rides per month expressed as a range: “200–300 rides for the
month of May” or “0–10 rides.” 37 For the most part, this information was for the
entire area covered by Direct Connect rather than being zone-specific. 38
What this meant was that the PSTA did not know exactly how many unique
users took advantage of the Direct Connect Uber subsidy, how often they used
it, or when and where they used it most. 39 It could not easily judge the success
33. FIRST OF THE FIRST-LAST MILES, supra note 20, at 7 (noting that the PSTA brought in
Care Ride to provide wheelchair accessible as part of Direct Connect since the two other providers,
Uber and United Taxi, could not guarantee accessible vehicles); Telephone Interview with Zak
Accuardi, Senior Program Analyst, TransitCenter (Jan. 25, 2018) (observing that the PSTA effort
was led by one person, Chris Cochran, and that an early data-sharing venture between Uber and the
City of Boston—discussed in another TransitCenter report, note 65, infra—was led by Chris
English). Although PSTA intended to design a program using Uber that could later be expanded to
include Lyft, the agency appears to have taken “Lyft at their word” that the company had the
necessary technological capability, only to be told the evening before Phase 2 was to be launched
that Lyft would not be participating. FIRST OF THE FIRST-LAST MILES, supra note 20, at 6, 10.
34. Telephone Interview with Bonnie Epstein, Transit Planner, Pinellas Suncoast Transit
Authority (Jan. 19, 2018).
35. Id.
36. E-mail from Bonnie Epstein, Transit Planner, Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority, to
Deepa Das Acevedo, Sharswood Fellow, U. Pa. L. Sch. (Sept. 5, 2018, 16:22 CDT) (on file with
author) (“really like to see trip level data from Uber – time of request, time of pick up, pick up
address, drop off address, trip length in miles, trip cost to the passenger, name of the passenger, and
their email address. The passenger contact information is important because we’d like to email/
survey program riders to see if the program is working for them, how they use it, and what they
think would make it better.”).
37. Telephone Interview with Bonnie Epstein, Transit Planner, Pinellas Suncoast Transit
Authority (Jan. 19, 2018).
38. Id.
39. FIRST OF THE FIRST-LAST MILES, supra note 20, at 8 (noting that PSTA only received
“monthly totals for eligible trips taken through Uber”—which, as Part II(A) notes, does not
accurately indicate the number of eligible trips actually taken). Note that TransitCenter’s report is
based on data that was not made available to the PSTA. Id. at 17, n. 25 (“After providing data to
support this case study, Uber provided the same data to PSTA—but as of this writing, Uber does
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of the program across different zones or within a zone over time. It also could
not determine whether Uber usage in the Pinellas Park zone was spread across a
wide population or concentrated among a few users, and (in either case) whether
these users previously used the bus route. In other words it was and continues to
be difficult for the PSTA to decide if the subsidized Uber service is functionally
equivalent to the circulator bus route that it replaces.
This state of affairs is apparently not a consequence of PSTA’s lack of
interest in accessing the data generated by the pilot. The agency would like to
measure a variety of metrics, including number of individual users, patterns of
usage (both geographic and temporal), zone-specific performance month over
month and, ideally, the number of rides that begin or end at each Direct Connect
location. 40 Likewise, the data shortage does not exist because the PSTA is
unwilling to think creatively about how to address its information needs while
respecting Uber’s privacy concerns. Since it believed that Uber was deeply
concerned about the privacy of its consumers, the agency proposed
implementing either a waiver or a pop-up notification that would appear when a
user selected a subsidized ride in order to inform her that data from the
transaction, scrubbed of individual identifiers, would be shared with the
agency. 41 According to the PSTA, Uber rejected the proposal. 42
Why did the PSTA agree to such an unsatisfactory deal in the first place?
To begin with, it’s possible that this was not the deal that the PSTA understood
itself to be making. This explanation was offered by TransitCenter, a third party
transit reform organization 43 that has conducted an in-depth study of the PSTA’s
experience. 44 According to TransitCenter, the PSTA’s initial contact at Uber
suggested that data sharing would not be a problem but the actual agreement was
negotiated by a different set of company officials more influenced by Uber’s
fear of exposing its data to public records requests. 45 Second, it appears that the

not have plans to share more data with PSTA as the pilot progresses beyond what is necessary to
invoice the agency.”).
40. FIRST OF THE FIRST-LAST MILES, supra note 20, at 17 & n. 25; Telephone Interview with
Bonnie Epstein, Transit Planner, Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority (Jan. 19, 2018).
41. Telephone Interview with Bonnie Epstein, Transit Planner, Pinellas Suncoast Transit
Authority (Jan. 19, 2018).
42. Id.
43. TRANSITCENTER, https://transitcenter.org (last visited Jan. 3, 2019).
44. Throughout this Article I cite a draft of TransitCenter’s case study on the PSTA, FIRST OF
THE FIRST-LAST MILES, supra note 20, that was shared with me privately. TransitCenter has also
published an earlier, more general report on public-private collaboration titled PRIVATE MOBILITY,
PUBLIC INTEREST: HOW PUBLIC AGENCIES CAN WORK WITH EMERGING MOBILITY PROVIDERS
(2016), http://transitcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/TC-Private-Mobility-Public-Interest20160909.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KTZ-X8WL].
45. Telephone Interview with Zak Accuardi, Senior Program Analyst, TransitCenter (Jan. 25,
2018) (“Uber said that they would share [with the PSTA] . . . and then they didn’t once it came
time to sign an agreement. . . . There’s an institutional disconnect . . . between the public face of
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agency understood itself to be at a disadvantage in its negotiations with Uber: a
current PSTA employee with significant knowledge of the program observed
that “Uber doesn’t really need these partnerships.” 46 (This view strongly
contrasts with the way some transit experts understand the power dynamic
between municipalities and rideshare platforms. 47) Finally, and despite the fact
that PSTA appears to have known both that data-sharing was important and that
it would be difficult with respect to Uber, the agency may not have understood
either the magnitude of the information deficit they would face or the impact it
would have on program operations. 48 The next Part explores these issues.
II. DATA, AND DATA DEFICITS
As the PSTA’s experience suggests, municipalities are often very interested
in getting data from their collaborations with rideshare platforms—but why?
And if rideshare data is so important, why do municipal actors seem to enter into
contracts with inadequate data-sharing protocols? What kinds of interventions
might help? The following subsections tackle the first and second questions,
while Part III offers both general and specific responses to the third.
A.

Public Uses of Rideshare Data

Municipalities as well as the individuals studying and advocating for them
are hungry for data regarding all aspects of gig work. A National League of
Cities representative remarked that several of its member cities were “freaking
out” (notwithstanding their general enthusiasm about the gig economy) because

Uber . . . and the actual people in Uber who have the power to negotiate.”). Accuardi also noted
that he had seen this kind of disconnect between individuals and attitudes toward data-sharing in a
few instances involving municipal contracts with Uber. James Paci describes a similar situation
involving the MBTA’s interactions with rideshare platforms, albeit with less negative results: the
MBTA deals on a weekly basis with company representatives who are significantly more
accommodating than the attorneys who actually handle the negotiations. Telephone Interview with
James Paci, Manager of Innovation and Analysis, MBTA (Aug. 29, 2018).
46. Telephone Interview with Bonnie Epstein, Transit Planner, Pinellas Suncoast Transit
Authority (Jan. 19, 2018). See also Telephone Interview with Michael McCall-Delgado, Field
Organizer, Amalgamated Transit Union (Sept. 1, 2016) (“One of the big differences is just the
vulnerability that they [municipalities] have . . . that companies just decide to leave.”).
47. Telephone Interview with Kirk Hovenkotter, National Network Coordinator,
TransitCenter (Aug. 30, 2016) (“I really don’t think that cities understand the leverage they have
over these companies so that they can get data from them.”); Telephone Interview with Paul
Mackie, Communications Director, Mobility Lab (Feb. 8, 2018) (“Cities do have some leverage
over the Ubers and Lyfts of the world.”).
48. Telephone Interview with Bonnie Epstein, Transit Planner, Pinellas Suncoast Transit
Authority (Jan. 19, 2018) (“maybe we didn’t know [data-sharing] was going to be this difficult but
yeah we did know.”).
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they lacked a basis on which to formulate any policy regarding gig companies. 49
Setting aside the fact that reviews and time logs can reveal details about the
working conditions of resident-drivers, there are two important reasons why
municipalities should care about data collection in their collaborations with
rideshare companies.
First, and most immediately, data collected as part of a new collaboration
with rideshare platforms can offer valuable information about the pilot program
itself. There are a handful of data points that are almost universally useful for
municipal actors. How many rides are completed under the program subsidy in
a given period (most often, one month)? Where do these rides originate and what
are their destination points? Which days of the week and times of day do the
rides occur? And what are the pre- and post-subsidy costs of trips taken? 50 Data
sharing that in some fashion addresses basic questions related to volume,
geography, timing, and cost are the closest thing to a minimal checklist for
municipalities eager to conduct their due diligence with respect to platform
vendors because they convey what is being paid for with reasonable precision.
Without that knowledge, local officials cannot compare the pilot’s performance
relative to either the expectations that were set for it or to previously existing
services. Consequently, these metrics are considered “Tier 1 factors” in Part III’s
model contract language.
A slightly more generous data-sharing agreement might include more
detailed information regarding pricing and usage patterns. How does surge
pricing affect program users? How satisfied is the average consumer of a
subsidized trip? Are most passengers repeat consumers or do individuals only
use the service sporadically when other options are unavailable? If there are high
frequency users, who are they? 51 These metrics are included among “Tier 2”
factors in Part III.

49. Telephone Interview with Nicole DuPuis, National League of Cities (July 26, 2016). See
also Telephone Interview with Jamie Dunphy, Policy Advisor to Commissioner Nick Fish on
Portland City Council (Oct. 28, 2016) (“we had very minimal information because it was a new
thing . . . we’ve actually struggled with that a lot . . . you don’t want to strangulate a new market
either . . . [but] we went in blind . . . we had some data . . . some anecdotes from other
jurisdictions.”).
50. Since first/last mile programs and their analogs in safe ride and para-transit contexts often
operate on a percentage subsidy up to a flat ceiling—say, fifty percent of the fare up to a maximum
of five dollars per ride—government actors can in theory estimate the minimum number of riders
using the program by dividing their monthly bill by the maximum subsidy. But this approach is
imperfect since riders need not use the maximum on each trip. The percentage/maximum listed is
taken from the PSTA’s program, as is the practice of roughly estimating riders per month (or per
billing cycle, since bills do not always arrive on a monthly basis). Telephone Interview with Bonnie
Epstein, Transit Planner, Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority (Jan. 19, 2018).
51. As one of my interlocutors told me, government actors would likely benefit from knowing
who these repeat players are in order to conduct focus groups as part of their assessment processes.
Telephone Interview with Zak Accuardi, Senior Program Analyst, TransitCenter (Jan. 25, 2018).
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Second, and beyond the life cycle of any individual pilot program, rideshare
data can also offer insights about urban infrastructure demands. Should a bus
route be redirected? Does a train line need to be extended? Are so many people
being dropped by personal vehicle on the north side of Main Street at a particular
cross road at certain times that the city government should designate that patch
of road a no-parking zone? 52 These are quintessentially local matters, unlike
many of the other concerns that also grow out of gig work but that are subject to
federal regulation or preemption. 53 If municipal actors do not take it upon
themselves to collect the information they need they will have nowhere to turn
to when it comes time to assess their long term public transit needs.
B.

Feeding Data Deficits

What contributes to circumstances like that of the PSTA, where municipal
actors who contract with rideshare platforms lack the data they need to measure
the success of the relationship? My conversations with transit experts and public
employees suggest that there are four categories of factors feeding data deficits,
namely: circumstantial limitations, public agency shortcomings, poor
information channels, and platform preferences.
To begin with, municipalities are hamstrung by broadly circumstantial
factors unrelated to their own actions or anyone else’s. The very newness of the
gig economy as well as its rapid pace of transformation make it difficult for
anyone who is not constantly observing rideshare companies to understand their
evolving technology and industry dynamics. The peculiar mechanics and
challenges of gig work are still unfamiliar to most Americans: as recently as
mid-2016, a Pew Research Center study found that just twenty-seven percent of
Americans had even heard of the term “sharing economy.” 54 Municipal actors
may be somewhat more conversant with basic terms and company names but
many of them lack the time and resources to meaningfully understand rideshare
platforms; indeed, those very limitations are one of the main reasons why
rideshare vendors appeal to municipalities in the first place.

See also FIRST OF THE FIRST-LAST MILES, supra note 20, at 13 (observing that “much of the pilot’s
ridership during [Phase 2] came from a core group of users who integrated the service into their
regular routine”).
52. Like the earlier examples involving bus routes and train lines, this last question regarding
no-parking zones was an actual example of the kind of information urban planners (not limited to
city officials) might find useful. Telephone Interview with Zak Accuardi, Senior Program Analyst,
TransitCenter (Jan. 25, 2018) (speaking with respect to Massachusetts Avenue in Boston).
53. See, e.g., U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. Seattle, 890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding
that Seattle’s ordinance enabling rideshare drivers to bargain collectively with platforms violates
the Sherman Act).
54. AARON SMITH, How Americans Define the Sharing Economy, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May
20, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/05/20/how-americans-define-the-sharingeconomy/ [https://perma.cc/JVT8-ANQJ].
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The newness of rideshare technology also likely exacerbates the sense of
powerlessness that many municipalities already feel in their interactions with
platforms. Platform exchanges are inherently difficult to see and to police
because of their private, disaggregated nature; local governments may wish to
regulate aspects of platform work without ever feeling like they realistically
can. 55 Even if they feel it is possible to act, they may hesitate to do so because
of the ease with which platforms can exit a market. 56 Uber need not move
factories or even sell off vehicles in order to leave a recalcitrant city, and few
cities can survive the logistical and reputational costs of losing Uber and Lyft
altogether. 57 This aspect of platform exchanges and the nervousness it engenders
do not easily dissipate even though municipalities may feel it is within their
rights, as consumers of a platform’s services, to request greater data sharing. 58
Second, municipal actors often contribute to the creation of data deficits by
failing to articulate clear goals as well as metrics for measuring those goals at
the beginning of a pilot program. 59 Many pilots aim to provide a lower cost
service that is at least equivalent to their existing programs, but it can be
surprisingly difficult to articulate what counts as equivalency. The MBTA, for
example, realized that rideshare paratransit would never be identical to shuttlebased paratransit because rideshare provides a curb-to-curb service while
shuttles operate door-to-door. 60 That is to say, because of their lack of training,
irregular participation in paratransit programs, and independent contractor status
(among other factors) rideshare drivers would never help passengers negotiate
the distance from their front doors to the vehicles the way a traditional shuttle

55. Telephone Interview with Jamie Dunphy, Policy Advisor to Commissioner Nick Fish on
Portland City Council (Oct. 28, 2016) (Noting that Portland’s push to create Accessory Short-Term
Rental regulations “was a bit reactionary” and that the City Council recognized that homeshare
platforms “were already here and it was almost impossible for us to stop it . . . they sort of forced
our hand.”).
56. Telephone Interview with Michael McCall-Delgado, Field Organizer, Amalgamated
Transit Union (Sept. 1, 2016) (noting that “One of the big differences is just the vulnerability that
[cities] have . . . that companies just decide to leave . . . . These companies have a history of just
deciding to leave cities [but] a municipal transit agency just doesn’t have that option.”).
57. Austin, TX is one of the few to have done so. Patrick Sisson, Uber, Lyft, and the Future
of Transportation in Austin, CURBED.COM (Dec. 7, 2016, 9:40 AM), https://www.curbed.com/
2016/12/7/13828514/uber-lyft-ride-austin-rideshare-get-me [https://perma.cc/U7E7-AJ8Z].
58. Telephone Interview with Bonnie Epstein, Transit Planner, Pinellas Suncoast Transit
Authority (Jan. 19, 2018) (“[I]n my mind that [benefiting from public subsidy] makes them [Uber]
more our client.”).
59. Telephone Interview with Zak Accuardi, Senior Program Analyst, TransitCenter (Jan. 25,
2018) (noting that “there’s this very basic first principles problem,” namely, municipal failure to
appreciate the “potentially profound long term implications” of collecting inadequate data from
rideshare pilots).
60. Telephone Interview with Diogo Lousa, Transportation Innovation Manager,
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (Feb. 9, 2018).
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driver would do. 61 This difference might make the MBTA’s new curb-to-curb
service more appealing to some users yet less useful to others. The question for
the agency, then, is whether a rideshare service that reaches different segments
of the same target population should be considered equivalent.
That municipalities may not fully anticipate and articulate positions on these
issues is understandable even if it carries serious consequences. Municipal
agencies are cash-strapped and time poor which can make it difficult to take
preparatory steps that scholars and analysts might view as bare necessities. 62
Agencies must often prioritize short-term financials, which can lead them to
devalue other interests for the sake of quickly launching a new service. 63 They
can feel vulnerable in the face of their own need, the enormous financial and
social capital of major rideshare platforms, and the knowledge that platforms are
relatively indifferent to threats of regulatory intervention. Nonetheless, agency
behavior is an important and obvious reason why data deficits occur.
Third, the search for data is hampered by poor information channels within
and between municipalities, as well as between municipal actors and regional or
national organizations. Within a single locality, there may be little
communication between a mayor’s office, a transit agency, other agencies or
councils, and specialized clusters within any of these bodies like para-transit
administrators. 64 Sometimes this lack of connectivity is driven by legal
restrictions: in 2015, Uber signed a voluntary data-sharing agreement (unrelated
to any public service provision) with the City of Boston. 65 Uber agreed to
provide information about all trips that began or ended within City limits,
aggregated at the zip code level, on a quarterly basis. Unfortunately, the
information went to the City of Boston rather than to the MBTA or even to the
Metropolitan Area Planning Council that coordinates transit planning for each

61. Id.
62. Telephone Interview with Jamie Dunphy, Policy Advisor to Commissioner Nick Fish on
Portland City Council (Oct. 28, 2016) (noting, with respect to Portland’s efforts to regulate
homesharing, that “the city is trying to do some of its own research . . . but we just don’t have the
staff or the capacity.”).
63. Telephone Interview with Paul Mackie, Communications Director, Mobility Lab (Feb. 8,
2018) (“Transit agencies . . . they’re just really concerned with the day to day . . . ‘how are we
going to keep these systems running?,’ not ‘how are we going to make these systems amazing?’”).
64. Telephone Interview with James Paci, Manager of Innovation and Analysis, MBTA (Aug.
29, 2018) (observing that, with respect to other subgroups within the MBTA or officials working
for the City of Boston, the paratransit pilot is “pretty silo-ed”).
65. SHIN-PEI TSAY & ZAK ACCUARDI, TRANSITCENTER, PRIVATE MOBILITY, PUBLIC
INTEREST: HOW PUBLIC AGENCIES CAN WORK WITH EMERGING MOBILITY PROVIDERS 38,
(2016), http://transitcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/TC-Private-Mobility-Public-Interest20160909.pdf [https://perma.cc/K59C-ZZ73].
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of the cities and towns in the Boston metro area. 66 The wrong public actor
received the information and could not share it with the right public actor. 67
Inadequate information channels are not just a local or governmental failing.
One of the reasons first-movers like the MBTA and PSTA report speaking so
frequently with their analogs elsewhere—sometimes at the rate of two to three
per week—is because there is relatively little information trickling down from
regional and national umbrella organizations. 68 Admittedly, entities like the
American Public Transportation Association (the “APTA”) and the Community
Transportation Association of America (the “CTAA”) are beginning to collect
information about pilot programs. 69 Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether
they can effectively disseminate that information and educate memberagencies. 70 Umbrella organizations have an especially important role to play in
66. Id.; About Us, METROPOLITAN AREA PLANNING COUNCIL, https://www.mapc.org/
aboutus/ [https://perma.cc/UH2Z-52H3] (last visited Jan. 3, 2019).
67. My understanding is that the City was contractually prohibited from sharing the data it
received with regional agencies like the MBTA. See TSAY & ACCUARDI, supra note 65, at 38 (also
noting that the agreement’s “confidentiality provisions are so strong that the city has been wary of
analyzing the data using internet-based (cloud) computing because of concerns that doing so could
be a breach of contract”).
68. Lousa named Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Seattle, Toronto, and Philadelphia
as among the cities whose transit officials had reached out to him and noted that several universities
had also been in contact. Telephone Interview with Diogo Lousa, Transportation Innovation
Manager, Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (Feb. 9, 2018). Bonnie Epstein, at the
PSTA, named Chattanooga, St Louis, Broward County (FL), and Westchester County (NY) as
among the localities that had contacted her. E-mail from Bonnie Epstein, Transit Planner, Pinellas
Suncoast Transit Authority, to Deepa Das Acevedo, Sharswood Fellow, U. Pa. L. Sch. (Jan. 26,
2018, 09:54 EST) (on file with author).
69. The APTA’s website lists some public-private rideshare collaborations along with
summary descriptions—in one case (Pierce County, WA) it includes a partial agreement with the
data sharing section redacted—but most of the information appears to be in the form of PowerPoint
presentations on individual agency experiences. See General Services Agreement between Lyft,
Inc., and Pierce County Public Transportation Benefit Area Corporation, AM. PUB. TRANSP. ASS’N,
https://www.apta.com/resources/mobility/Lists/Mobility%20Management/Attachments/41/Lyft%
20Agreement-ToShare.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6GF-XFKX] (last visited Jan. 2, 2019) (hereinafter
Pierce County General Services Agreement). See also, e.g., Will Rodman, How Transit Agencies
Are Using Emerging Mobility Services to Improve Access and Mobility and Solve Problems,
Presentation at the APTA Bus and Paratransit Conference (Reno, NV, May 10, 2017) (on file with
author); Christy Wegener, Lessons Learned in Implementing a Pilot TNC Project, Presentation at
the APTA Sustainability & Multimodal Planning Workshop (Minneapolis, MN, Aug. 6, 2017) (on
file with author). One exception is a report created especially for the APTA, although the report
itself does little more than gesture at the likely growth and potential benefits of public-private
collaborations with rideshare platforms. SHARED-USE MOBILITY CTR. (SUMC), AM. PUB.
TRANSP. ASS’N, SHARED MOBILITY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF PUBLIC TRANSIT, (Mar. 2016)
(on file with author).
70. Telephone Interview with Paul Mackie, Communications Director, Mobility Lab (Feb. 8,
2018) (discussing APTA and the CTAA and observing “I really think there’s a lack of leadership
at both the national and often at the local level in terms of transit.”).
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drawing generalizable lessons from first movers since direct agency-to-agency
conversations may lead to the unnecessary duplication of early mistakes. 71
Finally, data-sharing would be a non-issue if platforms were not so resistant
to it. In fact, platforms are not uniformly resistant to sharing data: TransitCenter
has received information regarding trips starting and ending in each of the census
block groups participating in the PSTA’s Direct Connect program—which is
considerably more information than the PSTA itself has received. 72 Similarly,
the MBTA receives cost-sharing information for each individual trip, although
perhaps not points of origin and destination below the zip code level. 73 A
representative from TransitCenter ventured a “strongly educated guess” that the
biggest obstacle to information transfers between public actors and platform
vendors is the specter of public records requests. 74 It is not entirely clear why
public records requests are so terrifying: aggregate numbers reported at the
census tract level are unlikely to be useful for potential competitors, and indeed
the higher information-sharing requirements faced by Uber and Lyft in New
York City do not seem to have adversely affected them. 75

71. I should note that public actors—both early movers and those they speak with—likely do
recognize the potential risks in duplicating contracts or regulations established elsewhere. Lousa,
for instance, notes that the MBTA tries “to give the message: try to design the program . . . based
on what is the situation in your area . . . your copy and paste of this program might not work
somewhere else.” Telephone Interview with Diogo Lousa, Transportation Innovation Manager,
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (Feb. 9, 2018). Likewise, although Dunphy
acknowledged that Portland’s data on homesharing elsewhere largely consisted of “some anecdotes
from other jurisdictions” but he also observed that “we had very minimal information because it
was a new thing . . . we’ve actually struggled with that a lot . . . we went in blind.” Telephone
Interview with Jamie Dunphy, Policy Advisor to Commissioner Nick Fish on Portland City Council
(Oct. 28, 2016).
72. Telephone Interview with Zak Accuardi, Senior Program Analyst, TransitCenter (Jan. 25,
2018).
73. Telephone Interview with Diogo Lousa, Transportation Innovation Manager,
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (Feb. 9, 2018). Lousa stated that the MBTA received
“a good level of information,” which he described as being both at the “zip code” level and at the
“individual trip” level. My later conversation with James Paci revealed that the MBTA receives
pick-up and drop-off information at the address-level from Lyft but only at the zip code level from
Uber. Telephone Interview with James Paci, Manager of Innovation and Analysis, MBTA (Aug.
29, 2018).
74. Telephone Interview with Zak Accuardi, Senior Program Analyst, TransitCenter (Jan. 25,
2018). One of the few agreements I have been able to locate does explicitly address the issue of
public records requests and imposes a fifteen-day waiting period before the government actor may
fulfill the request. It also states that the rideshare platform (in this case, Lyft) “will bear
responsibility for all legal costs associated with Lyft seeking a court order to prevent any such
disclosure.” Pierce County General Services Agreement, supra note 69, §5.3.
75. Telephone Interview with Zak Accuardi, Senior Program Analyst, TransitCenter (Jan. 25,
2018) (noting that he has “asked Lyft very explicitly what if any other negative fallout has there
been from New York City” and also that he has “never gotten a good answer” to the question of
why Freedom of Information Act requests are so nerve-wracking for rideshare platforms).
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A different explanation may be that for platforms—as indeed for public
actors—rideshare data is valuable for reasons only partly having to do with
rideshare itself. For platforms, the data that drivers and passengers generate is
their “most prized possession” because it “is a major underlying structure” for
the maintenance of market share as well as in the development of autonomous
vehicles. 76 For local governments, that same data can not only give them
information about expensive and effort-intensive pilot programs, but it can also
speak to broader trends in public transit that ought to inform their long term
infrastructure needs. While public actors might not be as lopsided as platforms
in their valuation of data over rides, current practices do not reflect the actual
importance of rideshare data for public transit administration. In the following
section, I outline some ways in which municipal actors and their supporters
among national organizations (like the APTA) and policy analysts (like
TransitCenter) may be able to improve data-collection and data-sharing with
rideshare vendors.
III. FIXING DATA DEFICITS
Three approaches, potentially undertaken by three different sets of actors,
can significantly improve the situation currently facing municipalities. This
section quickly outlines those approaches before turning to one specific
suggestion—better contract language—in greater detail and with examples.
A.

Broad Efforts and Attitudinal Shifts

First and most importantly, municipal actors can adequately acknowledge
the value of data collection at both the planning and contract negotiation stages.
During initial planning, officials must structure their pilots around specific, prearticulated goals and definitions, and also be clear eyed about the internal
hierarchy of those goals. For instance, if passengers in the paratransit pilot run
by the MBTA had only used the rideshare service at the same frequency that
they had previously used shuttles, the pilot would have already met its goal of
cutting the agency’s paratransit expenses. 77 In fact, though, rideshare passengers
use the subsidy more (while also reporting a higher degree of satisfaction) so
that the pilot is now no longer cheaper to run than the shuttle. 78 Is this
76. Telephone Interview with Kirk Hovenkotter, National Network Coordinator,
TransitCenter (Aug. 30, 2016). See also Alex Rosenblat & Luke Stark, Algorithmic Labor and
Information Asymmetries: A Case Study of Uber’s Drivers, 10 INT’L J. COMMC’N 3758 (2016)
(generally discussing the way Uber incorporates information collected by its drivers into a system
of “algorithmic management”).
77. Telephone Interview with Diogo Lousa, Transportation Innovation Manager,
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (Feb. 9, 2018).
78. Id. James Paci observed that if, for example, the average customer completed ten
subsidized trips on the MBTA’s conventional paratransit service before the rideshare pilot, they
now probably complete ten trips on the rideshare pilot and five trips on the conventional service,
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equivalency, improvement, or failure? The answer depends on how the MBTA
prioritizes cost-cutting relative to user satisfaction.
Once they have identified goals and metrics, municipalities must determine
which pieces of information will allow them to measure their progress toward
those goals and then do their best to ensure that adequate data protocols are
included in any contracts they negotiate with rideshare providers. This task is
only partially within their control: Uber and Lyft have been known to draw firm
lines and to exit markets when those lines are rejected by local officials or their
constituencies. 79 However, to the extent that contract language is negotiable—
or that it is useful to have a template in hand during negotiations—municipal
actors may want to consider the model language offered in subsection (B) below.
Second, regional and national organizations like the APTA and the CTAA
can cull information from first-movers like the PSTA and MBTA in order to
develop baseline best practices for other municipalities. What are bare minimum
metrics that every vendor contract should provide for? What might a vendor
contract with rideshare platforms even look like? To be sure, the information
requests that municipal actors make of platform providers will have to vary
according to the goals of their pilot projects. Still, umbrella organizations are
ideally situated to inform municipalities that, say, an offer of zip code data is
virtually meaningless and that they should negotiate using geographic units like
the census tract or the “traffic analysis zone.” 80 Ideally, umbrella organizations
could go further and develop more exhaustive versions of the model language
given in Part III(B).
Finally, third parties—perhaps non-profit analysts like TransitCenter and
Mobility Lab, or perhaps specially designed entities from the private market—
can help develop strategies to alleviate platforms’ fears regarding public records
requests. Uber itself has taken a step in this direction by creating Movement, an
online system that provides “anonymized data from over two billion trips to help
urban planning around the world.” 81 TransitCenter and Mobility Lab are not yet
certain whether the information Uber makes available via Movement is likely to
be useful to municipalities in either substance or presentation, but they agree that

which remains in use during the pilot. The cost of fifteen trips now is roughly equivalent to ten trips
earlier, but the challenge is in how to interpret the change in use patterns. Telephone Interview with
James Paci, Manager of Innovation and Analysis, MBTA (Aug. 29, 2018).
79. Austin, Texas discovered the rigidity of some rideshare policies in 2016. Uber and Lyft
strongly resisted calls to have their drivers undergo finger-printing and criminal background checks
like other for-hire transportation providers. Ultimately, the companies forced a referendum on the
issue and left Austin immediately after it became clear they had lost the vote. See Sisson, supra
note 57.
80. Telephone Interview with Zak Accuardi, Senior Program Analyst, TransitCenter (Jan. 25,
2018).
81. UBER MOVEMENT, https://movement.uber.com/cities?lang=en-US [https://perma.cc/CC
S6-QY9Q] (last visited Jan. 3, 2019).
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the underlying concept—a records request-immune holder of rideshare data—
has potential. 82 Third parties might also be able to guide municipal actors in the
implementation of anonymization or randomization techniques like those
discussed in Part III(C) below.
B.

Model Contract Language 83

One of the few things a municipal actor can do to avoid data deficits is to
fight for the best possible contract language—but this can be a challenging task.
What follows is intended as a starting point for municipalities that are
considering partnerships with rideshare companies; it is in no way exemplary or
exhaustive. The metrics that are most useful to a given municipal actor will
depend on the particular service it is trying to construct, while the information it
is ultimately able to acquire will depend on the skill of its negotiators and the
desirability of its market. However, in the absence of generic resources or
guidelines, this subsection offers language that municipalities can begin to think
with.
Tier 1 requirements reflect basic standards of public contracting and are
necessary if a municipality is to ascertain that the rideshare vendor is charging
the right amounts for services rendered. As a result these requirements should
be:
1. Non-negotiable;
2. Part of the contractual provisions that deal with payments from the public
purse to the vendor;
3. Provided on on-going basis, as a condition of payment;
4. Accurate (to a mutually agreeable degree, so as to protect legitimate trade
secrets) and subject to audit.
Tier 1 requirements include:
1. Number of completed rides;
2. Date and times of rides;
3. Origin and destination (ideally using the Traffic Analysis Zone unit
mentioned in Part III(A));
4. Total cost of the ride;
5. Requested payment from the public actor.
Tier 2 information requirements could appear in a separate part of the
contract (e.g., Information Sharing), may be presented on a periodical basis, and
are negotiable.

82. Telephone Interview with Zak Accuardi, Senior Program Analyst, TransitCenter (Jan. 25,
2018).
83. Thanks to Yonathan Arbel for the clarity and structure of the language contained here; all
errors remain mine.
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Tier 2 requirements may include:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Whether surge pricing was used and if so, the multiplier;
Passenger’s rating for the ride;
Average driver rating;
Passenger demographics (gender, race, overall passenger rating, et
cetera). 84

Given rideshare companies’ reluctance to share data with parties vulnerable
to public records requests, municipal actors would do well to place all these
requests within the context of a system that grants each passenger a programspecific identification number or that allows rideshare vendors to scramble data
in a limited way or to a limited degree. Both of these options are discussed in
Part III(C).
Example (based on a private contract used by Uber for similar purposes). 85
Tier 1 Provisions:
Service Fee. In consideration of Uber’s provision of the Uber Services, City
agrees to pay Uber a service fee on a per Transportation Services transaction
basis calculated as a percentage of the Fare, as provided to City via email or
otherwise made available electronically by Uber (“Service Fee”). Payments by
City will be made conditional on production of receipts that include, at a
minimum, ride date and time (accurate to 10 minutes); ride origin and ride
destination (accurate to 5 meters, using UTM coordinates); fare total; and,
service fee charged to the City. Uber represents the accuracy and veracity of the
receipts, which will be subject to audit by City. Receipts must be in a Comma
Separated Value file format (i.e., CSV).

Tier 2 Provisions:
Information Sharing. For purposes of project assessment, quality assurance, and
research, Uber will provide City with the following types of information on a 3month basis in electronic format using a Comma Separated Value file format
(i.e., CSV): applicability of surge pricing and the surge multiplier per ride;
passenger satisfaction rating; driver rating; passenger demographics, including
at a minimum, gender and race. The information provided is City’s property.

84. Most rideshare companies do not explicitly collect information regarding the race and
gender of their passengers but Uber’s website suggests that it is able to gather or guess much of this
information. See Privacy Policy, UBER, https://privacy.uber.com/policy [https://perma.cc/8VFDSFJK] (“We collect information when you create or update your Uber account. This may include
your name . . . government identification numbers . . . birth date, photo. . . . We may collect
demographic information about you, including through user surveys. In some countries, we may
also receive demographic information about you from third parties.”).
85. Services Agreement, https://s3.amazonaws.com/uber-regulatory-documents/country/unit
ed_kingdom/Uber+BV+Driver+Terms+-+UK+Preview.pdf [https://perma.cc/P82B-QLAF] (last
visited Jan. 3, 2019).
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Breach of information requirements shall constitute a material breach of the
agreement.

C. Beyond the Model Contract Language
It is one thing to say that each municipality will value different pieces of
information and must consequently construct unique contract language, and
another thing to actually adjust a template. How might the model language above
be tailored to suit a specific agency’s constraints or a specific program’s goals?
Consider the following imagined and actual examples.
If the PSTA decided that one of their goals was to increase bus and train use,
the agency would need to know whether Direct Connect was really making
transportation hubs more accessible. 86 In order to judge the program’s impact
on hub accessibility, the PSTA would want to measure the number of transfers
between Direct Connect rides and fixed-route hubs. Measuring transfers would
in turn require either a somewhat technically demanding “fare integration”
feature on the Uber app or a system whereby bus drivers and train ticket agents
manually log transfer requests. Regardless of the mechanism, the PSTA would
not be able to measure Direct Connect’s success in improving access to fixedroute transportation without an understanding of the “number of transfers”
metric.
Transfer measurement is not included within the versions of Tier 1 or Tier
2 provisions presented above. If the PSTA were to negotiate the development of
a fare integration feature on Uber’s app, the submission of transfer information
ought to be included under Tier 1. As I understand it, the feature would be
complicated and thus expensive to develop and the PSTA’s willingness to insist
on its inclusion in the overall Direct Connect program would reflect the agency’s
prioritization of greater hub accessibility. That importance should be signaled in
the contract by making transfer data a Tier 1 metric tied to the Service Fee.
A second, actual, example involving the MBTA shows how tailoring
information requests to program goals and infrastructures can have significant
benefits. Parts I(A) and II(B) discussed the paratransit pilot initiated by the
MBTA in 2016. 87 The agency’s goal was to develop a lower cost, on-demand
alternative to (and potential replacement for) its existing door-to-door shuttle
service. 88 Potential users of the new pilot—like users of the MBTA’s established
86. This was an example mentioned by Accuardi. FIRST OF THE FIRST-LAST MILES, supra
note 20, at 15 (“While participants can still present their Direct Connect receipt for a free bus
transfer, there is no systematic means of validating whether customers do in fact use the bus service
in connection with a subsidized TNC or taxi trip.”).
87. On-Demand Paratransit Pilot Program, MASS. BAY TRANSP. AUTH. https://www.mbta.
com/accessibility/the-ride/on-demand-pilot [https://perma.cc/C5VL-HGFG] (last visited Jan. 3,
2019). See also Telephone Interview with Diogo Lousa, Transportation Innovation Manager,
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (Feb. 9, 2018).
88. See supra Part II(B).
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paratransit service—had to register with the agency, and as part of that
registration they received unique identification numbers to use when requesting
a ride. 89 In other words, the integration of MBTA identification numbers and the
rideshare pilot was treated as a Tier 1 requirement.
Because the rideshare subsidy was made accessible to individuals through
their MBTA identification numbers, Uber and Lyft were willing to share some
of the key metrics listed under Tier 1 above. 90 This is not to say that the MBTA
found it easy to negotiate data sharing with its rideshare vendors—on the
contrary, it was both an important and challenging part of the process. 91 But the
MBTA set out to measure performance in predetermined ways and it set data
sharing expectations for the new service that were as similar as possible to
existing services. 92 At least partly due to this approach, the agency’s battle for
information was markedly different from the struggle experienced by the PSTA.
The MBTA itself acknowledges that it may have had an easier time
negotiating with rideshare vendors because of a difference in baseline
expectations: public paratransit operators habitually collect more information
about users in order to determine eligibility and accessibility than do public mass
transit operators. 93 Consequently, mass transit agencies may have to be more
creative in their efforts to assuage a rideshare vendor’s fears regarding records
requests. If a mass transit agency finds that it cannot negotiate an identification
number system to use as a buffer, it may consider allowing rideshare providers
to use a type of Randomized Response Technique when submitting data. 94 There
are several variations of the Randomized Response Technique, but in one classic
version a randomly chosen subset of survey participants answers a question in a
predetermined way—for instance, by rolling a die and answering “yes” or “no”
or truthfully depending on the outcome of the die. 95

89. Id.
90. For instance, the MBTA receives pre- and post-subsidy trip costs on an individual trip
basis. Telephone Interview with Diogo Lousa, Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (Feb.
9, 2018).
91. Id. (observing that “[data sharing] was one of the hard issues of the negotiation, and the
negotiations went long with each of the companies individually”).
92. Id. Indeed, Lousa noted that one of the four main goals of the pilot was that it had to be
constructed in such a way that it could be subjected to periodic feasibility tests (the other three
goals were to increase customer mobility, provide on-demand paratransit service, and cut agency
costs). Lousa also noted that the MBTA wanted to have “the same level of information” from its
rideshare providers as from its conventional providers.
93. Id. Lousa acknowledged that the MBTA’s situation was different from those of agencies
like the PSTA that were running first/last mile programs because paratransit services frequently
incorporate eligibility requirements.
94. Frey A. V. St. John et al, Testing Novel Methods for Assessing Rule Breaking in
Conservation, 143 BIO. CONSERVATION 1025, 1026 (2010).
95. Id. (noting that there “are a number of RRT designs described in the literature”). In this
variation, respondents would be given instructions along the following lines: if the die lands on one
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Randomized response may not translate directly to the rideshare context, but
it should be easy enough to develop a similar scrambling method to protect
passengers’ identities and reassure rideshare vendors. For instance,
municipalities might allow rideshare vendors to adjust the information for a
predetermined percentage of passengers along one metric—say duration of trip,
or date and time. In that case, however, the contract should clearly state which
metrics may be scrambled, the percentage of total data points that may be
scrambled, and an explanation of what exactly was done to the affected data.
CONCLUSION
That municipalities would eventually contract with platforms has been
evident for some time. 96 How they should go about constructing those
relationships, however, very much remains an open question. When they seek
out rideshare platforms as vendors, municipalities are understandably concerned
with providing much-needed transit services and with reducing the strain on
their already overburdened budgets. Nevertheless, they must begin to appreciate
that rideshare labor is at least as important for the data it generates as for the
transportation it provides, and they must start to restructure their agreements
with platforms to reflect this invisible, but very real, value of the labor they
contract for. Otherwise, whether it happens at the end of a six-month pilot or
halfway through a five-year revitalization plan, municipal actors will find
themselves confronted by multiple, pressing data deficits.

through four, please answer truthfully; if the die lands on five, please answer YES (regardless of
the truth); if the die lands on six, please answer NO (regardless of the truth).
96. Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Government Law: The
Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L. J. 901, 959–63 (2015).
However, Rauch and Schleicher’s optimism regarding the ease of data-sharing has not quite been
borne out. Id. at 961.
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